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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear those matters originating out of the 
Justice Court where the District Court has ruled on the constitutionality of a statute 
or ordinance. See U.C.A. § 78-5-120(7) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 
78a-7-118(2008). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On November 30, 2006, Defendant Rio Davis appealed the conviction 
of "maintaining a nuisance" entered in the Hyde Park Justice Court. See 
Notice of Appeal. (Record P. 054). 
2. On March 29, 2007, Davis filed a Motion and Memorandum in the First 
District Court to dismiss and quash his conviction based upon alleged 
unconstitutionality of the Justice Court system. See Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss and Quash. (Record P. 072). 
3. On or about April 13, 2007. Davis filed a second Motion to Dismiss the 
pending action based upon the alleged unconstitutionality of the Hyde 
Park City nuisance ordinance. See Motion to Dismiss Pending Action. 
(Record P. 098). 
4. On April 27. 2007. Plaintiff Hyde Park City filed an opposition to both 
of Defendant's motions to dismiss. See Response to Motion to Dismiss 
and Response to Motion to Dismiss and to Quash Conviction. (Record 
pp. 119. 128). 
] 
On Jul) 30. 2007. the First District Court orally announced a decision 
denying both of Davis' motions. See Minutes Ruling on Motion Notice. 
(Record P. 141). 
During the July 30. 2007 hearing, the Court directed Hyde Park City to 
prepare a proposed order. Id. 
The city prepared the order, circulated the order to Mr. Davis, and filed 
the same with the Court. See generally, Objection to Plaintiffs Order 
on Motion to Dismiss and to Quash Conviction. (Record P. 145). 
On August 24, 2007. Davis filed an objection to Hyde Park's proposed 
order. See Objection to Plaintiffs Order on Motion to Dismiss and to 
Quash Conviction. (Record P. 145). 
On September 28. 2007. Mr. Davis was tried and convicted in the 
District Court for maintaining a nuisance. See Sentence. Judgment and 
Commitment. (Record P. 153). 
On October 11. 2007. Davis filed an objection to the Court*s verdict, 
judgment and sentence on the nuisance conviction. See Objection to 
Oral Verdict. Judgment and Sentence. (Record P. 154). 
On October 15. 2007, Mr. Davis filed a Notice of Appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. See first notice of appeal. (Record P. 156). 
The District Court having received objections to the decisions stated 
oralh from the bench, and also receiving a notice of appeal from the 
Defendant, never signed a final order denying defendant's motions 
regarding constitutionality of the city nuisance ordinance and the 
constitutionality of the justice court system. See, generally. Judgment 
Roll and Index). 
13. On March 4, 2008, while awaiting a final signed order as to the 
constitutional issues. Davis filed a Notice to Submit for Decision on its 
Objection to the Oral Verdict Judgment and Sentence. See Notice to 
Submit for Decision. (Record P. 177). 
14. On March 14, 2008, Mr. Davis filed another notice of appeal 
("Amended Notice of Appeal"). See Amended Notice of Appeal. 
(Record P. 187). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court lacks appellate jurisdiction because Defendant / Appellant 
Jerald Rio Davis (hereinafter *;Mr. Davis" or uDavis") has not appealed a final 
order from the District Court. The final judgment rule precludes a party from 
taking an appeal from any orders that are not final. Mr. Davis has continued to 
seek adjudication of his constitutional issues at the District Court level after filing 
his appeal. The District Court has only made an oral pronouncement denying 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pending Action and Motion to Quash. Such an 
oral pronouncement made by the District Court is not a final, appealable order. 
Moreoeven the Hyde Park Cit\ nuisance ordinance in not unconstitutionalh vague 
nor does it conflict with state statutes. Finally. Mr. Davis has failed to overcome 
the presumption of constitutionality regarding the Justice Court structure as well 
J 
as the nuisance ordinance and penalty. Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Davis' 
appeal must be denied. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
OVER THIS CASE BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT HAS NOT 
ISSUED A FINAL ORDER ON APPELLANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS PENDING ACTION AND MOTION TO QUASH 
This Court lacks appellate jurisdiction because Mr. Davis has not appealed 
a final order from the District Court. Rather, Davis has appealed the District 
Courf s oral pronouncement denying Appellant's Motion to Dismiss Pending 
Action and Motion to Quash (hereinafter "Motions^ or "Appellant*s Motions"). 
Under the well established final judgment rule, this Court only has appellate 
jurisdictions over appeals of final orders and those eligible for certification under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Mr. Davis' Appeal of the District Courf s oral 
pronouncement does not satisfy the final judgment rule and must be dismissed. 
The final judgment rule generally precludes a party from taking an appeal 
from any orders that are not final. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. 817 P.2d 323, 
325 (Utah 1991). Furthermore, the law uis well settled in the state that the 
statements made b> a trial judge are not the judgment of the case and it is onl} the 
signed judgment that prevails/* State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885. 887 (Utah 1978). 
Appeals from oral pronouncements of the court are not properl} taken. Mackay 
Co.. 817 P.2d at 325. When an order appealed from is not final and not certified or 
eligible for certification, it is not properl} taken and the remedy is dismissal of the 
appeal Id citing Crossland ^. Peck, 738 P.2d 631. 633 (Utah 1987). 
4 
"A judgment is final when it ends the controversy between the parties litigant." 
Kennedy v. New Era Industries, lnc, 600 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979). 
Mr. Davis has not appealed a final judgment nor has the District Court's 
oral pronouncement been certified under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). 
Rather, contrary to the final judgment rule, Davis has appealed an oral 
pronouncement given by the District Court during a hearing held on July 30, 2007. 
(Record P. 141). In particular, Mr. Davis seeks to appeal the District Court's oral 
denial of his motions. (See Appellant's Brief, p. 53, ^  2). 
While Mr. Davis may suggest that the September 28, 2007, trial judgment 
is the final order, this should not be the case because Davis's constitutional claims 
were not ruled upon in the trial and said claims remained open for further 
adjudication based upon Davis' own action. After the September 28, 2007 trial, 
Mr. Davis continued to seek adjudication of the constitutional issues at the District 
Court. As late as March 5, 2008, Mr. Davis filed a Notice to Submit for Decision 
on his earlier filed objection to the constitutional claims pronouncement. (Record 
P. 177). The District Court had earlier directed Hyde Park City to take further 
action in the case by drafting an order on Davis* Motions. (See Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 53-54, ^|103). The proposed order was objected to by Mr. Davis and thus 
never signed by the District Court. (See Appellant's Brief pp. 53-54. ^ 103: See. 
also. Record P. 145). Davis* objections to the proposed order were to have been 
addressed before a final order could be entered. 
If the court had reconsidered its position with respect to the constitutional 
claims after receiving Mr. Davis* Notice to Submit for Ruling, it would have 
caused the Davis appeal to become moot. Clearly, Davis himself believed that the 
controversy regarding the constitutional issues was alive, and had not been 
resolved by the court because he was asking the court to readjust its oral ruling1 
before issuance of the signed order. (See Record P. 177). Again, this action was 
occurring nearly five months after filing the first notice of appeal. 
Accordingly, because the District Court's oral pronouncement denying the 
constitutional claims was not reduced to a written order, and because the 
September 28. 2007 trial judgment on Davis' nuisance violation did not address or 
resolve the pending constitutional claims, there is not a final order in this case. 
Mr. Davis' appeal is not properly taken and must be dismissed. 
II. ALL ORDINANCES ARE PRESUMED CONSTITUTIONAL. THE 
DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO PROVE THE CITY NUISANCE 
ORDINANCE IS OTHERWISE. 
Mr. Davis' next argument is based on a claim that the Hyde Park City 
nuisance ordinance is unconstitutional. It is essential to begin this response with 
two well-established, basic principles, courts follow when reviewing the 
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. The first principle was restated in State 
v. Willis. 100 P.3d 1218, 1219; 2004 UT 93 (Utah 2004), where the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed that. u[w]hen addressing a constitutional challenge to a statute, we 
"Trial courts have clear discretion to reconsider and change their position with 
respect to am orders or decision as long as no final judgment has been rendered/* 
U.P.C., Inc. \. R.O.C. Gen.. Inc.. 990 ?2d 945. 945 (Utah Ct App. 1999) 
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presume that the statute is valid and resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of 
constitutionality. (Emphasis added.) The second principle is found restated in 
Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom. 73 P.3d 334. 339; 2003 UT 26. \\ 8 (Utah 2003). In 
Midvale the Utah Supreme Court cautioned that courts should be ^reluctant to 
entertain facial attacks because the statute [or ordinance] ma)' be declared 
unconstitutional in all instances. The usual approach is to wait until a statute is 
applied in the suspected and offensive way." Mr. Davis* attack of the cit) nuisance 
ordinance is facial rather than in its application. 
Normally in criminal cases the prosecution has the burden of proof. 
However, following Willis. Appellant in the immediate case has the burden of 
overcoming the presumption of constitutionality and proving that the ordinance is 
defective. This Court should avoid holding the city nuisance ordinance 
unconstitutional unless the Appellant's claim is so clear that it overcomes the long 
standing presumption of constitutionality. Further, according to Midvale City, 
even if this Court has some question regarding the constitutionality of the 
ordinance, it should be reluctant to find it unconstitutional until after it can review 
the ordinance as against the facts of the immediate case. Hyde Park City submits 
that the ordinance is constitutional. Mr. Davis has no law to the contrar). He 
cannot overcome the presumption of validity here. The ordinance in question was 
drafted by a team associated with the Utah League of Cities and Towns and 
presented to all municipalities as part of a model ordinance more than 30 years 
ago The same language found in the Hyde Park nuisance ordinance has been 
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enacted by most cities and towns across the state. And used in untold numbers of 
prosecutions. Despite all this, in a memorandum where Appellant cites to dozens 
of cases, that are largely off-point they do not refer to a single case that questions 
the constitutionality of this model nuisance ordinance. 
The ordinance is constitutional. 
III. THE CITY NUISANCE ORDINANCE IS NOT IN CONFLICT 
WITH STATE STATUTES. IN FACT, IT IS SPECIFICALLY 
AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTE. 
Mr. Davis' alleges, based upon a constitutional challenge, that the city 
nuisance ordinance impermeably conflicts with the state nuisance statute. This 
assertion is not grounded in fact or law. Utah law specifically authorizes cities, 
such as Hyde Park, to define nuisances and enforce the same. 
U.C.A. § 10-8-84(1) provides that wThe municipal legislative body may 
pass all ordinances and rules, and make all regulations, not repugnant to law, 
necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all powers and duties conferred 
by this chapter, and as are necessary and proper to provide for the safety and 
preserve the health, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and 
good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and its inhabitants, and for the 
protection of property in the city/* 
U.C.A. § 10-8-84(1). quoted above, is a general statement granting 
authority to cities to pass ordinances such as the city's nuisance ordinance. But 
directh on point. U.C.A. § 10-8-60 is a specific statuton grant of authorit) to 
cities to pass nuisance ordinances as the}' deem fit. U.C.A. § 10-8-60 provides 
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that cities "'may declare what shall be a nuisance, and abate the same, and impose 
fines upon persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist/* The 
state statute does not say that cities may enforce the state's definition of 
nuisance—it directly states that cities may declare what shall be a nuisance in their 
city. 
It is true, as Davis alleges, but completely immaterial here, that Utah 
statutes. U.C.A. § 76-10-801, 802. 803 and 78-38-9, define a "nuisance" or 
"public nuisance" differently than the city defines a "nuisance." Because, as set 
forth above, U.C.A. § 10-8-60provides express authority to cities to "declare 
what shall be a nuisance. " 
Davis cites to several Utah cases in an attempt to support his allegation that 
the City ordinance is in conflict with state law. All of these cases are completely 
off-point. 
The first case cited by Davis is Allgood v. Larson, 545 P.2d 530 (Utah 
1976). Contrary to Davis' assertion, Allgood stands for the proposition that where 
the state and cit)7 both define the same conduct as a criminal offense, the "city 
cannot impose a greater sentence than that provided by state law . . . ." Id. at 530. 
In the immediate case, the cit}7 ordinance does not impose a greater sentence for 
violating the cit} nuisance ordinance than is imposed for a violation of the state 
nuisance statute. Allgood is inapplicable to the immediate case. 
The second case Davis cites to is Richfield Cifr v. Walker. 790 P.2d 87 
(Utah App. 1990). Again, this case does not suggest the Cit} nuisance ordinance is 
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in conflict with state law. In Richfield City, the Court of Appeals reviewed a case 
where the defendant was prosecuted for a DUl. The facts in Richfield City are that 
the defendant was found in actual physical control of his vehicle in the parking lot 
of a hotel with a blood alcohol level of .21 percent. The issue on appeal was to the 
language of the city ordinance Walker was prosecuted under. When originally 
adopted, the city ordinance was identical to the controlling state statute. However, 
subsequent to the city's enactment, the Utah Legislature amended the controlling, 
state DUl, statute. Richfield City did not correspondingly amend its ordinance. 
Consequently, at the time Walker was prosecuted under the city ordinance, it was 
not identical to the controlling state statute. Nevertheless, the court held that the 
city "ordinance need not be identical to the controlling state statute to be 
consistent with it'* and upheld Walker's conviction. Id. at 90. Although this case 
is more likely to support the prosecution's position in the immediate case, it is 
largely inapplicable. Richfield City presents a situation where a controlling state 
statute is compared to a subordinate city ordinance. There is no controlling state 
statute in the immediate case. U.C.A. § 10-8-60 specificall) provides that cities 
"may declare what shall be a nuisance." City's have never been given the authorit} 
to define what shall be a DUl. 
The next two cases cited b} Mr. Davis are not criminal cases but rather 
civil. Cannon v. Neuberger. 268 P.2d 425 (Utah 1954) is a case where the plaintiff 
brought a nuisance lav suit against his neighbor seeking an order of the court 
requiring the defendant to top and trim three Carolina Poplar trees and two 
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Siberian Elm trees. Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining. 262 P. 269 (Utah 1927) is a case 
where the plaintiff brought a nuisance law suit seeking damages to his home on 
account of the gases, odors and fumes that drifted from the oil refiner}' onto 
plaintiffs property and rendered it uncomfortable and undesirable for residence 
purposes. In the former case, the court upheld the finding of nuisance; in the later, 
the court ordered a new trial. The undersigned fails to see the relevance of these 
cases to the allegation that the Hyde Park City ordinance is in conflict with state 
law. The next cases cited by defendants are similar and go to factual issues rather 
than legal. They are not relevant to Davis' appeal. They do not provide any 
guidance as to whether the city ordinance is in conflict with state law. 
Based on clear statutory authority. Hyde Park has the right to define what a 
nuisance is even if its definition is dissimilar to the state definition of nuisance. 
Mr. Davis' appeal, as based on conflict with state law, should be rejected. 
IV. THE CITY NUISANCE ORDINANCE IS NOT 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE. THE ORDINANCE 
ADEQUATELY DEFINES NUISANCE. 
Mr. Davis set forth numerous maximums in his memorandum similar to the 
following: "It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for 
vagueness if its prohibition is not clearly defined." (See Appellant's Brief p. 23. 
1143.) The city agrees with these various statements. However, the city disagrees 
with the allegation that the city nuisance ordinance is vague. The ordinance clearl)7 
defines what is prohibited. 
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It appears that the only case cited by Davis suggesting that the city nuisance 
ordinance is void for vagueness is Jones v. Logan City, 428 P.2d 160; 19 Utah 2d 
169 (Utah 1967). More so than the Davis* cases referred to above, this case is 
completely off point. The facts in Jones are as follows: Logan City created a 
Board of Condemnation. The Board was given authority from the City 
Commission (City Council) to determine whether any building or structure 
constituted a menace to public health or public safety. The City Commission did 
not. in any manner, define what might be ua menace to public health or public 
safety.'* Without any standards upon which the Board could base its findings, the 
Board was left to use its complete subjective discretion to decide what constituted 
Cwa menace to public health or public safety.'* The Board determined that Jones* 
house was a nuisance and ordered it to be demolished. On appeal the. LTtah 
Supreme Court invalidated the city ordinance—not because it was 
unconstitutionally vague, but rather because it constituted an unconstitutional 
delegation of power from the City Commission to the Board of Condemnation. 
The court held. Cw[w]e are of the opinion that the ordinance attempts to make an 
unlawful delegation of power to the Cit) "s Board of Condemnation. We are of the 
opinion that by reason of the delegation of powers by the Cit) Commission the 
ordinance above referred to is invalid." Id. at 171. 
The cit) nuisance ordinance is not vague on its face. The ordinance has 
specific language defining what constitutes a nuisance and Jones ^. Logan Cits is 
completeh inapplicable. 
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V. APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT AS TO PENALTY IS INACCURATE. 
Mr. Davis" argument is that "the city cannot impose a greater sentence than 
that provided by state law." (See Appellant's Brief at p. 28, |^56.) The city's 
response is simple, despite Appellant's insinuation, the city ordinance does not 
allow for a sentence greater than allowed by state law or provided by the state 
nuisance statutes. Davis' memorandum includes a discussion about the sentence 
available under city ordinances but completely fails to mention the available 
sentence under comparable state law or the state's specific grant of sentencing 
authority to cities. 
VI. MR. DAVIS HAS FAILED TO OVERCOME THE 
PRESUMPTION FAVORING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
THE JUSTICE COURT SYSTEM. 
Mr. Davis* brief contains a lengthy discussion about justice courts, the 
essence of which is a general allegation that justice is not found in the Justice 
Court system. Davis first argues that the Justice Court structure violates the 
separation of powers of the Utah Constitution. (See Appellant's Brief p. 40. ^60). 
Davis further alleges that Justice Courts are not capable of rendering independent 
decisions because they are controlled by the municipal corporations that will only 
retain them so long as the fines they impose are financially remunerative to the 
cities. (See Appellant's Brief p 33. j^66). In making both arguments, Davis has 
provided no evidential*}' support in favor of his conclusions and therefore cannot 
overcome the presumption of constitutionality. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that for a party to succeed in making 
claims that a justice court system is unconstitutional, it "would need to support 
them with specific evidence and cogent legal argument." West Jordan Citv v. 
Goodman, 135 P.3d 874, 883; 2006 UT 27 (Utah App 2006). The Courts have 
consistently declined to address state constitutional claims that have been 
inadequately briefed. See State v. Norris, 48 P.3d 872. 880 (Utah 2001); People v. 
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1988). In reviewing a separation of powers 
argument, the Court has applied a three part test to determine whether a law 
violates separation of powers principals: 
First, are the [actors] in question "charged with the exercise of power 
properly belonging to" one of the three branches of government? 
Second, is the function that the statute has given the [actors] one 
"appertaining to" another branch of government? The third and final 
step in the analysis asks: if the answer to both of the above questions 
is "yes/* does the constitution "expressly" direct or permit exercise of 
the otherwise forbidden function? If not. article V. section 1 is 
transgressed. 
West Jordan City v. Goodman, 135 P.3d 874, 881 (Utah 2006)(citing Jones \ . 
Utah Bd. Of Pardons & Parole. 2004 UT 53, ^ 23. 94 P.3d 283)). 
The Utah Supreme Court considered identical claims to those of Mr. Davis 
in West Jordan City v. Goodman. In that matter. Defendant Christopher Goodman 
alleged that the West Jordan Justice Court structure violated the separation of 
powers principal of the Utah Constitution. Id. Second, he claimed that the Judges 
in that matter had an inherent conflict of interest because the\ were controlled b\ 
the cities that benefited from the fines the\ imposed. Id The Utah Supreme Court 
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affirmed the lower court's ruling because the Defendant had failed to offer factual 
support other than "mere speculation" regarding the claims. The Court held: 
In short Goodman fails to explain why or how he believes the 
district court erred. These deficiencies in Goodman's briefing, 
coupled with the presumption that statues passed by the legislature 
are constitutional require that we affirm the ruling of the district 
court of Goodman's separation of powers claim. We also affirm the 
district court's ruling rejecting Goodman's claim that Judge Kunz 
has a conflict of interest in every case because Goodman failed to 
establish the factual predicate for this claim. Goodman offered only 
three pieces of evidence to the district court. As the district court 
found, however, none of this evidence established an actual conflict 
of interest. 
Id, at 882. 
In the instant case, Davis has provided no legal precedent, or analysis to 
indicate why he should prevail. The bulk of Mr. Davis' discussion draws upon 
broad conclusions wholly absent in fact. Davis cites to newspaper editorials and 
county council minutes regarding a criminal justice assessment conducted in Salt 
Lake County (See Appellant's Brief at pp 35-37, y70, ^ }75). It is interesting to 
note, that the stated purpose of the county assessment was to find ways to reduce 
the current and future jail population in Salt Lake County. (See Appellant's Brief 
Appendix VV. Page 1). To say nothing of the unreliable and unauthenticated 
nature of these documents themselves, the record is devoid of grounds as to why 
the assessment conclusions or editorials would be applicable in the present case. 
Like Goodman. Mr. Davis makes unsubstantiated claims that Utah Justice 
Courts are profitable and concludes therefore that a constitutional violation has 
occurred. However, unlike the Goodman case. Davis candidh acknowledges that 
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he has no factual basis to suggest that the Hyde Park Justice court falls within the 
scope of the allegations: "Defendant/Appellant does not and cannot allege that the 
justice court judge is actually influenced by the fact that he is beholden to the 
City's leaders" (See Appellant's Brief p. 47 T|93). Emphasis Added. 
Because Davis does not acknowledge the controlling test set forth in 
Goodman, or provide an)7 facts from the record that would support his 
conclusions, he fails to overcome the presumption that the justice court system is 
constitutional. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT AND THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT 
EXCEED THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE AS ALLOWED BY STATE 
LAW. 
Davis argues that the $50 fine imposed by the District Court was at odds 
with the powers extended to cities and towns and was therefore repugnant to law. 
(See Appellant's Brief p. 52, ^ J 101). Mr. Davis does not elucidate his argument or 
application further. As discussed earlier in this brief, U.C.A. § 10-8-60 allows the 
cities to declare "what shall be a nuisance, and abate the same, and impose fines 
upon persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist." Because the 
Hyde Park City ordinance does not exceed the penalty allowed b} state statue, and 
because the fine imposed upon the Davis was only $50.00, there is no violation. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should deny relief requested in Mr. Davis" appeal. The District Court 
has not entered a final order on Mr. Davis' constitutional claims. The city nuisance 
ordinance and justice court is constitutional and nothing presented in Appellant's 
memorandum overcomes the long-standing presumption of constitutionality as to the city 
ordinance or the structure of the justice court. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th of December, 2008 
DAINES & WYATT. LLP 
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ADDENDUM 
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10-8-60 
Title 10 - Utah Municipal Code 
Chapter 08 - Powers and Duties of AH Cities 
10-8-60. Nuisances. 
They may declare what shall be a nuisance, and abate the same, 
upon persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist. 
No Change Since 1953 
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10-8-84 
Title 10 - Utah Municipal Code 
Chapter 08 - Powers and Duties of All Cities 
10-8-84. Ordinances, rules, and regulations — Passage — Penalties. 
IHTML 
(1) The municipal legislative body may pass all ordinances and rules, and makdpElf1 
regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or discharging gHord 
powers and duties conferred by this chapter, and as are necessary and proper to provide 
for the safety and preserve the health, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, 
peace and good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and its inhabitants, and for 
the protection of property in the city. 
(2) The municipal legislative body may enforce obedience to the ordinances with 
fines or penalties in accordance with Section 10-3-703. 
Amended by Chapter 323, 2000 General Session 
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76-10-801 
Title 76 - Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 10 - Offenses Against Public Health, Safety, Welfare, and Morals 
76-10-801. "Nuisance" defined -- Violation -- Classification of offense. 
(HTML 
(1) A nuisance is any item, thing, manner, condition whatsoever that is dangerkff 
to human life or health or renders soil, air, water, or food impure or unwholesome. [Word 
(2) Any person, whether as owner, agent, or occupant who creates, aids in creating, 
or contributes to a nuisance, or who supports, continues, or retains a nuisance, is guilty 
of a class B misdemeanor. 
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session 
nn 
76-10-802 
Title 76 - Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 10 - Offenses Against Public Health, Safety, Welfare, and Morals 
76-10-802. Befouling waters. 
[HTML 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he: PDF 
Word 
(1) Constructs or maintains a corral, sheep pen, goat pen, stable, pigpen, chicken 
coop, or other offensive yard or outhouse where the waste or drainage therefrom shall 
flow directly into the waters of any stream, well, or spring of water used for domestic 
purposes; or 
(2) Deposits, piles, unloads, or leaves any manure heap, offensive rubbish, or the 
carcass of any dead animal where the waste or drainage therefrom will flow directly into 
the waters of any stream, well, or spring of water used for domestic purposes; or 
(3) Dips or washes sheep in any stream, or constructs, maintains, or uses any pool 
or dipping vat for dipping or washing sheep in such close proximity to any stream used 
by the inhabitants of any city or town for domestic purposes as to make the waters 
thereof impure or unwholesome; or 
(4) Constructs or maintains any corral, yard, or vat to be used for the purpose of 
shearing or dipping sheep within twelve miles of any city or town, where the refuse or 
filth from the corral or yard would naturally find its way into any stream of water used 
by the inhabitants of any city or town for domestic purposes; or 
(5) Establishes and maintains any corral, camp, or bedding place for the purpose of 
herding, holding, or keeping any cattle, horses, sheep, goats, or hogs within seven miles 
of any city or town, where the refuse or filth from the corral, camp, or bedding place will 
naturally find its way into any stream of water used by the inhabitants of any city or 
town for domestic purposes. 
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session 
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76-10-803 
Title 76 - Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 10 - Offenses Against Public Health, Safety, Welfare, and Morals 
76-10-803. "Public nuisance" defined — Agricultural operations. 
(HTML 
(1) A public nuisance is a crime against the order and economy of the state an<p>DF 
consists in unlawfully doing any act or omitting to perform any duty, which act or JWord 
omission: 
(a) annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of three or 
more persons; 
(b) offends public decency; 
(c) unlawfully interferes with, obstructs, or tends to obstruct, or renders dangerous 
for passage, any lake, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or 
highway; 
(d) is a nuisance as defined in Section 78B-6-1107; or 
(e) in any way renders three or more persons insecure in life or the use of property. 
(2) An act which affects three or more persons in any of the ways specified in this 
section is still a nuisance regardless of the extent to which the annoyance or damage 
inflicted on individuals is unequal. 
(3) (a) Agricultural operations that are consistent with sound agricultural practices 
are presumed to be reasonable and do not constitute a public nuisance under 
Subsection (1) unless the agricultural operation has a substantial adverse effect on the 
public health and safety. 
(b) Agricultural operations undertaken in conformity with federal, state, and local 
laws and regulations, including zoning ordinances, are presumed to be operating within 
sound agricultural practices. 
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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78A-7-118 
Title 78A - Judiciary and Judicial Administration 
Chapter 07 - Justice Court 
78A-7-118. Appeals from justice court — Trial or hearing de novo in 
court. 
(1) In a criminal case, a defendant is entitled to a trial de novo in the district court 
only if the defendant files a notice of appeal within 30 days of: 
(a) sentencing after a bench or jury trial, or a plea of guilty in the justice court 
resulting in a finding or verdict of guilt; or 
(b) a plea of guilty in the justice court that is held in abeyance. 
(2) If an appeal under Subsection (1) is of a plea entered pursuant to negotiation 
with the prosecutor, and the defendant did not reserve the right to appeal as part of the 
plea negotiation, the negotiation is voided by the appeal. 
(3) A defendant convicted and sentenced in justice court is entitled to a hearing de 
novo in the district court on the following matters, if he files a notice of appeal within 30 
days of: 
(a) an order revoking probation; 
(b) an order entering a judgment of guilt pursuant to the person's failure to fulfil the 
terms of a plea in abeyance agreement; 
(c) a sentence entered pursuant to Subsection (3)(b); or 
(d) an order denying a motion to withdraw a plea. 
(4) The prosecutor is entitled to a hearing de novo in the district court on: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double jeopardy or 
denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment holding invalid any part of a statute or ordinance; 
(e) a pretrial order excluding evidence, when the prosecutor certifies that exclusion 
of that evidence prevents continued prosecution; or 
(f) an order granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest. 
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HTML 
PDF 
Word 
(5) Upon entering a decision in a hearing de novo, the district court shall remand 
the case to the justice court unless: 
(a) the decision results in immediate dismissal of the case; 
(b) with agreement of the parties, the district court consents to retain jurisdiction; 
or 
(c) the defendant enters a plea of guilty in the district court. 
(6) The district court shall retain jurisdiction over the case on trial de novo. 
(7) The decision of the district court is final and may not be appealed unless the 
district court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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78-38-4.7 JUDICIAL CODE 746 
78-38-4.7. Transportation of forest products or native 
vegetation into or through the state. 
Timber forest products, or native vegetation transported 
into or through the state must be accompanied by a shipping 
permit or proof of ownership. n>H7 
78-38-4.8. Exemptions. 
The provisions of this chapter do not apply to the transpotv 
Lation of: 
(1) wood chips, sawdust, and bark; 
(2j products transported by the owner of the property 
or his agent from which the products were removed, or 
(3) products for personal consumption incidental to 
camping and picnicking which is limited to the amount: 
(a; needed for the duration of the picnic or 
campout; and 
(In used at the campsite. 1987 
78-38-4.9. Violation as misdemeanor. 
Violation of Sections 78-38-4.5 th rough 78-38-4.7 is a class B 
misdemeanor . 1992 
78-38-5. Manufacturing facility in operation over 
three years — Limited application of nui-
sance provisions. 
(1) Notwithstanding Sections 78-38-1 and 76-10-803, no 
manufacturing facility or the operation thereof shall be or 
Decome a nuisance, private or public, by virtue of any changed 
conditions in and about the locality thereof after the same has 
oeen in operation for more than three years when such 
manufacturing facility or the operation thereof was not a 
auisance at the time the operation thereof began, provided, 
the manufacturing facility does not increase the condition 
asserted to be a nuisance and that the provisions of this 
subsection shall not apply whenever a nuisance results from 
the negligent or improper operation of any such manufactur-
ing facility. 
(2) The provisions of Subsection (1) of this section shall not 
affect or defeat the right of any person to recover damages for 
any injunes or damage sustained on account of any pollution 
of. or change in the condition of, the waters of any stream or on 
account of any overflow of the lands of any person. 
(3) Any and all ordinances now or hereafter adopted by any 
county or municipal corporation in which such manufacturing 
facility is located, which makes the operation thereof a nui-
sance or providing for an abatement thereof as a nuisance in 
the circumstances set forth in this section are null and void; 
provided, however, that the provisions of this subsection shall 
not apply whenever a nuisance results from the negligent or 
improper- operation of any such manufacturing facility U)Hi 
78-38-6. "Manufacturing facil i ty" defined. 
As used in this act. "manufacturing facility" means any 
factory, plant, or other facility including its appurtenances, 
where the form of raw materials, processed materials, com-
modities, or other physical objects LS converted or otherwise 
changed into other materials, commodities, or physical objects 
or where such materials commodities, or physical objects are 
combined to form a new material, commodity, or physical 
object u)8i 
78-38-7. Agr icul tura l o p e r a t i o n s — Nuisance liability. 
(1) Agricultural operations that are consistent with sound 
agricultural practices are presumed to he reasonable and do 
not constitute a nuisance unless the agricultural operation 
has a substantial adverse effect on the public health and 
safets 
(2i Agricultural oocrations undertaken in conformity with 
federal, state, and local laws ana regulations, including zoning 
ordinances, arc presumed to be operating within sound agri-
cultural practice^ 1995 
78-38-8. "Agricultural operation" defined. 
As used in this act. "agricultural operation" means any 
facility for the production for commercial purposes of crops 
livestock, poultry, livestock products, or poultry products. 
1981 
78-38-9. Nuisance — Right of action to abate nuisances 
— Drug houses and drug deal ing — Gambling 
— Group criminal activity — Prost i tut ion — 
Weapons. 
(1) Every building or place is a nuisance where: 
(a) the unlawful sale, manufacture, service, storage-, 
distribution, dispensing, or acquisition occurs of any con-
trolled substance, precursor, or analog specified in Title 
58, Chapter 37. Controlled Substances; 
(b) gambling is permitted to be played, conducted, or 
dealt upon as prohibited in Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 11; 
Gambling, which creates the conditions of a nuisance as 
defined in Subsection 78-38-1(1); 
(c) criminal activity is committed in concert with two or 
more persons as provided in Section 76-3-203.1; 
(d) parties occur frequently which create the conditions-
of a nuisance as defined in Subsection 78-38-1(1); 
(e) prostitution or promotion of prostitution is regu-
larly carried on by one or more persons as provided im* 
Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13, Prostitution; and 
(f) a violation of Title 76. Chapter 10, P a r t 5, Weapons;., 
occurs on the premises. 
(2) It is a defense to nuisance under Subsection (l)(a) if the 
defendant can prove that the defendant is lawfully entitledrto:' 
possession of a controlled substance. 
(3) Sections 78-38-10 through 78-38-16 govern only an£ 
abatement by eviction of the nuisance as defined in Subsections 
i ' l ) . 1999^ 
78-38-10. Nuisance — Abatement by evict ion. 
(1) Whenever there is reason to believe tha t a nuisance 
under Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16 is kept, maintained, 
or exists in any count}', the county attorney of the county, the 
city attorney of any incorporated city any citizen or citizens of. 
the state residing in the county, or any corporation, partner-
ship or business doing business in the county, in his or their" 
own names, may maintain an action in a court of competent: 
jurisdiction to abate the nuisance and obtain an order for the. 
automatic eviction of the tenant. 
(2) The court may designate a spokesperson of any group of 
citizens who would otherwise have the right to maintain an-
action in their individual names against the defendant under-
fills section. i m 
78-38-11. Abatement by eviction order — Grounds. 
An order of abatement by eviction may issue only upon a~ 
showing by the applicant by a preponderance of the evidence 
that: 
(1) the applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless* 
the order of abatement by eviction issues; 
(2) the threatened injury to the applicant outweighs 
whatever damage the proposed order of abatement y 
eviction may cause the party so ordered; . , 
(3) the order of abatement by eviction, if issued, woul 
not be adverse to the public interest; and • , 
<4) there is a substantial likelihood that the aPPllca? 
will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, ° r 
case presents serious issues on the merits which shoul 
the subject of further litigation. 
78-38-12. P r i o r acts of th rea t s of violence — Protection 
of wi tnesses . , 
At the time of application lor abatement of the nu l sa r iCef (0f 
eviction pursuant to Sections 78-38-10 and 78-38-11, ^P1"00*^ 
the exisyw'-p of {he nuisance depends, in whole or m P 
5-117 JUDICIAL CODE 640 
-117. Filing and docketing of abstract 
) The judge, on the demand of a party in whose favor 
;ment is rendered, shall provide the party with an abstract 
be judgment in substantially the form approved by the 
icial Council. 
!) The abstract may be filed in the office of the clerk of the 
rict court of any county in the state but shall be docketed 
he judgment docket of that district court. 
5) The clerk shall note the time of receipt of the abstract on ' 
abstract and on the docket. 1989 
5-118. Execution on judgment. 
rom the time of the docketing in the office of the clerk of 
r
 district court execution may then be issued within the 
le time, in the same manner, and with the same effect as if 
led on a judgment of the district court. 1989 
5-119. Judgment not a lien unless so recorded. 
1) Except as provided under Subsection (3), a judgment 
Ldered in a justice court does not create a lien upon any real 
>perty of the judgment debtor unless the judgment or 
stract of the judgment: 
(a) is recorded in the office of the county recorder of the 
county in which the real property of the judgment debtor 
is located; and 
(b) contains the information identifying the judgment 
debtor as referred to in Subsection 78-22-1.5(4) either: 
(i) in the judgment or abstract of judgment; or 
(ii) as a separate information statement of the 
judgment creditor as referred to in Subsection 78-22-
1.5(5). 
(2) The lien runs for eight years from the date the judgment 
as entered in the district court under Section 78-22-1 unless 
e judgment is earlier satisfied. 
(3) State agencies are exempt from the recording require-
ent of Subsection (1). 2001 
}-5-120. Appeals from justice court — Trial or hearing 
de novo in district court. 
(1) In a criminal case, a defendant is entitled to a trial de 
ovo in the district court only if the defendant files a notice of 
ppeal within 30 days of: 
(a) sentencing after a bench or jury trial, or a plea of 
guilty in the justice court resulting in a finding or verdict 
of guilt; or 
(b) a plea of guilty in the justice court that is held in 
abeyance. 
(2) If an appeal under Subsection (1) is of a plea entered 
)ursuant to negotiation with the prosecutor, and the defen-
lant did not reserve the right to appeal as part of the plea 
legotiation, the negotiation is voided by the appeal. 
(3) A defendant convicted and sentenced in justice court is 
entitled to a hearing de novo in the district court on the 
following matters, if he files a notice of appeal within 30 days 
± 
(a) an order revoking probation; 
(b) an order entering a judgment of guilt pursuant to 
the person's failure to fulfil the terms of a plea in abeyance 
agreement; 
(c) a sentence entered pursuant to Subsection (3)(b); or 
(d) an order denying a motion to withdraw a plea. 
(4) The prosecutor is entitled to a hearing de novo in the 
district court on: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a 
finding of double jeopardy or denial of a speedy tnal; 
(d) a judgment holding invalid any part of a statute or 
ordinance; 
(e) a pretrial order excluding evidence, when the pros-
ecutor certifies that exclusion of that evidence prevents 
continued prosecution; or 
(f) an order granting a motion to withdraw a plea of 
guilty or no contest. 
(5) Upon entering a decision in a hearing de novo, the 
district court shall remand the case to the justice court unless: 
(a) the decision results in immediate dismissal of the 
case; 
(b) with agreement of the parties, the district court 
consents to retain jurisdiction; or 
(c) the defendant enters a plea of guilty in the district 
court. 
(6) The district court shall retain jurisdiction over the case 
on trial de novo. 
(7) The decision of the district court is final and may not be 
appealed unless the district court rules on the constitutional-
ity of a statute or ordinance. 2001 (ist.s.s.) 
78-5-121. Docket to be kept — Enumerat ion of entries 
required. 
Every justice court judge shall keep or cause to be kept a 
docket. The following information shall be entered in thei 
docket under the title of the action to which it relates: 
(1) the title to every action or proceeding; 
(2) the object of the action or proceeding, and the 
amount of any money claimed; 
(3) the date of the service of the summons and the time 
of its return; 
(4) a statement of the fact if an order to arrest the' 
defendant is made or a writ of attachment is issued; 
(5) the time when the parties or any party appears, or 
a party's nonappearance, if default is made; 
(6) minutes of the pleadings and motions in writing by;; 
referring to them, and if not in writing, by a concise^ 
statement of the material parts of the pleadings; 
(7) every adjournment, stating on whose application 
and to what time; 
(8) a demand for a trial by jury, when made, by whom,^  
and the order for the jury; 
(9) the time appointed for the return of the jury and for 
the trial; 
(10) the names of the jurors who appear and are sworn; 
(11) the names of all witnesses sworn and at whose 
request; 
(12) the verdict of the jury and when received, or if the-
jury disagree and are discharged, the disagreement and 
discharge; 
(13) the judgment of the court including the costs 
included and when entered; 
(14) an itemized statement of the costs; 
(15) the time of issuing an execution and to whom, and 
the time of any renewals; 
(16) a statement of any money paid to the court, when, 
and by whom; and 
(17) the receipt of any notice of appeal, and of &$ 
appeal bond filed. 108e 
78-5-122. Docket entr ies — P r i m a facie evidence. 
Entries in a justice court judge's docket under Section 
78-5-121, certified by the judge or his successor in office, are 
prima facie evidence of the facts stated. ] 
78-5-123. Docket index. 
Ajudge shall keep or cause to be kept an alphabetical ^ V 
to the names of the parties to each judgment in his docket w1 
a reference to the page of entry. The names of the parties so 
be entered in the index by the first letter of the farD2 
i960 
surname. 
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